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In the Utah Court of Appeals 
GILLHAM ADVERTISING, INC., ] 
a Utah Corporation, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant ; 
vs. ] 
TIM WILLIAMS and SCOTT 
ROCKWOOD, ] 
Defendants/Respondents. ; 
i Case No. 880398 
JURISDICTION STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction for this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Respondents Tim Williams and Scott Rockwood 
("Williams and Rockwood"), Defendants below, moved the 
district court for summary judgment in accordance with Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). Respondents prevailed 
and Appellant Gillham Advertising, Inc. ("Gillham"), Plaintiff 
below, now appeals. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The only issues on appeal are whether the court 
properly granted summary judgment and whether Williams and 
Rockwood' were properly awarded costs for depositions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to March 26, 1987, Respondents Tim Williams and 
Scott Rockwood ("Williams and Rockwood") were working for 
Appellant Gillham Advertising, Inc. ("Gillham"). (R. 003 f4). 
Both were employees at will, having never signed employment 
agreements with Gillham or agreements not to compete. 
(R. 080 1(4) . Moreover, although each were given "Vice 
President" titles, neither were ever corporate officers. 
(R. 227, see also Corporation Annual Reports attached as 
Exhibits 1 and 2.1 ). During their employment with Appellant, 
Williams and Rockwood worked on the KSL advertising account. 
(R. 080 f5). KSL had never signed a contract with Gillham 
agreeing to exclusively employ Gillham for its advertising 
needs. (R. 080 %7). 
The undisputed testimony is that Williams and 
Rockwood were hoping to buy the Gillham business. (R. 103). 
1. The Corporation Annual Reports filed by Gillham for 1986 and 1987 were 
attached as Exhibits A and B to Respondents' Reply to Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. These 
reports were not included in the record on file with the District Court. 
However, Respondents have moved to have the record supplemented to 
include the two documents. 
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They were dissatisfied with Richardson's management 
philosophy. (R. 116-117). They entered into negotiations 
with Richardson to buy Gillham, but came to believe he was not 
negotiating in good faith, (R. 156). Richardson himself 
admits that he had no intention of selling to Williams and 
Rockwood alone. (R. 118). He preferred to sell to all 
employees. (R. 114). 
Williams and Rockwood decided to develop a plan on 
their own time for their own business if they were not 
successful in purchasing Gillham. (R. 144-145). They 
prepared a "To Do" checklist (R. 165-166) which included items 
which needed to be done prior to forming their own business. 
Some of these items were eliminated, others were accomplished 
on Williams and Rockwood's own time and some not attempted. 
(R. 148, 153). When a copy of the "To Do" checklist was found 
in the Gillham parking lot by a Gillham employee, Williams and 
Rockwood were fired by Richardson. (R. 121). After 
Respondents were fired they formed their own advertising 
agency called Williams and Rockwood Advertising. (R. 082 
f15). They then presented a plan to KSL in an effort to 
obtain some of KSL's advertising business. (R. 083 1118). The 
effort was successful. (R. 083 119). 
Despite the fact that under Utah law Williams and 
Rockwood were free to make plans to form their own business on 
their own time prior to their termination, Williams and 
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Rockwood were sued by their prior employer based on alleged 
misuse of "confidential business information." (R. 002-
R. 007). In his deposition, the Plaintiff admitted that no 
"confidential business information" had been misused. (R. 083 
f21, R. 109-110). Defendants then promptly moved for summary 
judgment which was granted. (R. 248-249). This appeal 
followed. 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is appropriate in cases where there 
exists no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant is 
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure Rule 56(c). The court below correctly 
found that this case presented no issues of material fact 
which would preclude summary judgment in favor of Williams and 
Rockwood. 
I. APPELLANT'S CONCESSION THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO 
MISUSE OF GILLHAM BUSINESS INFORMATION MAKES 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENTS APPROPRIATE ON 
ALL OF APPELLANT'S CLAIMS. 
Appellant's complaint consists of four causes of 
action. In its First Cause of Action, Appellant alleges that 
Respondents breached their employment duty by using Gillham's 
business information to promote their own interests as a 
separate business entity rather than the interests of their 
-4-
previous employer, Gillham Advertising, Inc. (R. 004 f11). 
The remaining three causes of action are varied allegations 
that Williams and Rockwood misused "Gillham business 
information" in forming their own business. (R. 004 fll, 
R. 005 115, R. 006 120, R. 007 125). Thus each of Appellant's 
claims clearly rested on a fundamental premise that 
Respondents had misused "Gillham business information". 
Utah law allows an employee to use his general 
knowledge, experience, memory and skill so long as he does not 
use or disclose any of the secrets of his former employer. 
Microbiological Resource Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 
1981) citing Caiman Unfair Competition, Trademarks & 
Monopolies, (3rd ed.), §§ 51.1 pp. 349-50; accord, Safeway 
Stores v. Wilcox, 220 F.2d 661, 665 (10th Cir. 1955). This 
rule encourages competition while protecting the individual's 
right to exploit his own skill and knowledge. Microbiological 
Resource Corp., 625 P.2d at 697. Thus before Appellant could 
prevail on a claim for misuse of business information, he 
would have had to prove that the information was secret or 
confidential. 
Appellant below did not simply fail to meet its 
burden of showing that any information used was confidential, 
but, in fact, unequivocally conceded that there had been no 
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misuse of Gillham business information.2 The information used 
by Williams and Rockwood did not contain knowledge not 
general ly known; none involved communication under an express 
or implied agreement l imi t ing t h e i r use; none qual i f ied as 
sec re t and none were acquired in any wrongful manner. Because 
a l l claims se t forth in Appel lant ' s complaint were predicated 
2. Q: Your obligation is to t e l l us the information which you 
alleged has been misused, you have to describe i t . If 
you don' t have i t , under our in terrogator ies you had an 
obligation to describe i t to us. 
A: Okay. If you have provided us with everything t h a t ' s 
been taken, then there is no Gillham business information 
Q: That has been --
A: -- that has been misused. 
(R. 102: Richardson Depo. 77:15-23). 
Q: But you cannot tell me right now a single piece of 
Gillham business information that has been misused; is 
that correct. 
A: That's correct. 
(R. Ill: Richardson Depo. 65:6-9). 
Q: Every one of your contentions in your complaint is based 
on misuse of, quote, "Gillham business information." We 
have asked you to identify for us what is the Gillham 
business information that you allege was misused. 
In response to that, you've said you can't identify 
it unless you know what Scott and Tim took. We have 
given you everything that they took. 
You now state that none of that is confidential --
A: (Mr. Marsden, Plaintiff's attorney) 
Correct. 
(R. 109-110: Richardson Depo. 59:22-60:5). 
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on the misuse of Gillham business information, those claims 
were no longer viable once Appellant conceded no misuse of 
information had taken place. Thus it was entirely proper for 
the trial court to grant summary judgment for Respondents. 
II. APPELLANT DID NOT RAISE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH 
WOULD PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Appellant's brief sets forth an array of what it 
terms "Controverted Facts." That is a misnomer. As a general 
rule, the facts themselves although in the main irrelevant are 
not controverted. Simply calling these facts "controverted/' 
does not make them so and does not create an issue of fact on 
which this court can reverse the lower court's grant of 
summary judgment. Appellant has also listed such facts out of 
order chronologically to create the impression that Williams 
and Rockwood solicited the KSL business before they were 
fired. They also have presented certain facts and record 
citations out of context in order to create an inaccurate or 
misleading impression. Exhibit 3 addresses each allegedly 
"controverted" fact individually to correct these 
inaccuracies. 
An issue of fact cannot be created by a bare 
contention unsupported by the record. Massey v. Utah Power & 
Light, 609 P.2d 937 (Utah 1980). Moreover when a 
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party moves for summary judgment, and that motion i s supported 
by a f f i d a v i t s , the opposing party must do more than simply 
r e s t on i t s p leadings . Franklin Financial v . New Empire 
Development Co.. 659 P.2d 1040, 1044 (Utah 1983) (party 
r e s i s t i n g Rule 56 summary judgment motion must f i l e responsive 
a f f i d a v i t s ra i s ing factual i s s u e s , or r i sk c o u r t ' s conclusion 
that no factual i s s u e s e x i s t ) ; see a l s o , Busch Corp. v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1987). 
Respondents f i l e d two a f f i d a v i t s in support of t h e i r 
motion for summary judgment both containing Will iams' and 
Rockwood's a t t e s t a t i o n s that : 
While employed at Gillham, I did not personal ly , 
nor did I p a r t i c i p a t e with anyone e l s e , in 
present ing a plan t o perform adver t i s ing 
business for KSL, Utah County Journal, D ig i ta l 
Technology or any other c l i e n t of Gillham 
Advert is ing . 
(R. 075-076 f4 , R. 082 f f l 6 - 1 7 , R. 167-168 f 4 ) . 
Despite Appel lant 's contention that some kind of 
f iduciary duty was breached, Appellant has not presented 
evidence in support of that content ion. In l i g h t of 
Respondents' a f f i d a v i t s , Appellant could not simply r e s t on 
a l l e g a t i o n s in i t s pleadings to r e s i s t the summary judgment.3 
3. Appellant did f i l e an a f f i d a v i t below referencing a page from Keith 
H i l l ' s Day-Timer. (Keith H i l l was a former Gillham employee working for 
KSL who was a l so a friend of Respondents). However, Appellant offered 
no explanation of the ambiguous notat ion nor did Appel lant's counsel 
inquire about the entry in H i l l ' s depos i t ion. This unexplained notation 
does not refute Williams' and Rockwood's unqualif ied testimony that they 
did not s o l i c i t Gillham's c l i e n t s u n t i l a f ter they had been terminated 
or Keith H i l l ' s testimony that Respondents did not s o l i c i t KSL u n t i l 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The undisputed f a c t s b e f o r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t were t h a t 
Wi l l iams and Rockwood, w h i l e s t i l l Gil lham employees , made 
c e r t a i n preparatory e f f o r t s for c r e a t i n g a new a d v e r t i s i n g 
agency . Those e f f o r t s , however, d id not i n c l u d e s o l i c i t a t i o n 
of Gil lham c l i e n t s or any a c t forbidden by law. 
I I I . WILLIAMS AND ROCKWOOD DID NOT BREACH ANY DUTY 
OWED TO GILLHAM. 
As noted above, a l l of A p p e l l a n t ' s c l a i m s were based 
on misuse of Gil lham b u s i n e s s i n f o r m a t i o n . However, 
when A p p e l l a n t became p a i n f u l l y aware t h a t no b u s i n e s s 
in format ion had been misused , i t a t tempted t o brea the l i f e 
i n t o i t s compla int by b a s i n g a c la im f o r breach of f i d u c i a r y 
duty on a phrase c o n t a i n e d i n A p p e l l a n t ' s compla int taken out 
of c o n t e x t . 4 See P l a i n t i f f ' s P o i n t s and A u t h o r i t i e s in 
O p p o s i t i o n t o Defendants ' Motion for P a r t i a l Summary Judgment, 
(R. 1 8 9 - 1 9 4 ) . A p p e l l a n t ' s compla int makes on ly a s i n g l e 
r e f e r e n c e t o a breach of f i d u c i a r y duty by Wi l l iams and 
Rockwood. However, t h a t duty i s s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s c r i b e d as 
regard ing " t h e i r b u s i n e s s conduct i n t h e use of t h e Gil lham 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
af ter they were f i red . H i l l Depo. p. 41 l i n e s 12-16 (R. 224), and 
(R. 134-137). 
4. Appellant has once again employed s imilar t a c t i c s in i t s appeal to th is 
court. Appellant, in i t s br ief , attempts to conjure up a cause of 
act ion for "intentional interference with economic r e l a t i o n s . " Such a 
claim i s conspicuously absent from both Appellant's complaint and the 
record below. See discuss ion infra at IV. 
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business information." (R. 006 119-20). Even if Appellant's 
complaint is interpreted as one for breach of fiduciary duty, 
however, the trial court properly found that no such duty had 
been breached. 
A. The Preliminary Efforts Of Williams And 
Rockwood To Form A Competing Business Is 
Conduct Permitted By Utah Law. 
The law does not forbid an employee from organizing a 
rival business while still employed by a potential competitor: 
Even before the termination of his agency, [the 
employee] is entitled to make arrangements to 
compete except that he cannot properly use 
confidential information peculiar to his 
employer's business and acquired therein. Thus, 
before the end of his employment, he can 
properly purchase a rival business and upon 
termination of his employment immediately 
compete. 
Restatement (Second of Agency), § 393 comment e (1958) 
(emphasis added); see also Las Luminarias of the New Mexico 
Council of the Blind v. Isengard. 92 N.M. 297, 587 P.2d 444 
(1978); Mulei v. Jet Courier Service. Inc., 739 P.2d 889 
(Colo. App. 1987). Utah has adopted the Restatement approach 
and further defines the right of the employee to include "the 
right to advise customers of the fact that he is going to 
quit; and that thereafter he will be working for a 
competitor." Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872 (Utah 
1978). 
The cases cited by Appellant do not support 
Appellant's proposition that Williams and Rockwood violated 
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any duty owed to Gillham because each case involved the 
solicitation of an employee's clients and undermining of the 
employer's business before the employment relationship ceased. 
The defendants in Duane Jones Co, v. Burke, 306 N.Y. 
172, 117 N.E.2d. 237 (N.Y, App. 1954), consisted of officers, 
shareholders and employees of the plaintiff advertising 
agency. Those defendants met together and agreed to either 
take over plaintiff's business or resign en masse and form a 
competing agency. When the president refused to sell the 
company, defendants threatened to resign, telling him that the 
plaintiff's customers had already been "presold'' on the 
proposed new agency. The evidence before the court was that 
the president responded to the threat saying: "'In other 
words, you are standing there with a Colt .45, holding it at 
my forehead, and there is not much I can do except give up?', 
to which Hayes replied: 'Well, you can call it anything you 
want, but that is what we are going to do.'" Duane Jones at 
241. The conduct which the court concluded was a breach of 
the duty owed by employees, included concerted, blatant and 
coercive solicitation of the plaintiff/employer's accounts for 
a competing corporation while still in plaintiff's employ, 
conduct which is reprehensible whether engaged in by officers, 
directors or regular employees. 
Similarly, the defendants in Hoaaan & Hall & Higgins, 
Inc. v. Hall, 18 Utah 2d 3, 414 P.2d 89 (1966), while serving 
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as directors and stockholders in the plaintiff corporation, 
solicited clients away from the plaintiff for the corporation 
they would be forming. Defendant Hall admitted that while 
still in plaintiff's employ he had contacted several of 
plaintiff's accounts, informed them that both he and the other 
defendant would be leaving and asked if the client would like 
Mr. Hall to continue to service those accounts. Id. at 91. 
Defendants thereafter resigned and took the files for the 
accounts they had solicited from plaintiff with them. Like 
the court in Duane Jones, the Hoaaan court also found 
defendants liable to their former employer for their disloyal 
conduct. 
Duane Jones, Hoaaan and the instant case all involve 
advertising agencies. However, that is where the similarity 
ends. Williams and Rockwood were very interested in 
purchasing the Gillham agency. That interest was discussed 
with Mr. Richardson after Mr. Richardson had already expressed 
a desire to sell the agency to Gillham employees. Richardson 
Depo. 100:17-21. Richardson was not coerced into 
negotiations, but willingly engaged in those negotiation 
efforts with Respondents. When Williams and Rockwood became 
concerned that Richardson was not negotiating in good faith, 
Williams and Rockwood developed a contingency plan to create a 
new agency in case their attempt to purchase Gillham failed. 
However, according to Mr. Rockwood's testimony, Respondents' 
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"desire always was and still was to buy the agency." 
(R. 160). The idea of creating a competing agency only came 
to fruition when Respondents were fired, and Respondents had 
no choice but to pursue their contingent plan. 
Appellant has not presented this court or the court 
below with a scintilla of evidence that Williams and Rockwood 
solicited any Gillham accounts before leaving Gillham (let 
alone the kind of mass solicitation involved in the cases 
cited by Appellant). Post-termination solicitation of Gillham 
accounts, on the other hand, cannot constitute a violation of 
any alleged duty. Microbiological Research Corp., 625 P.2d at 
700.5 
B. Respondents Owed No Duty To Gillham 
Greater Than The Duty Of A Regular 
Employee. 
Appellant attempts to s ides tep Utah law—which 
c lea r ly allows employees to act as Williams and Rockwood 
did—by a l leging they were off icers of the corporation owing a 
f iduciary duty of loyal ty and good f a i t h . The fact i s 
Williams and Rockwood were not of f icers of the corporation. 
They were given t i t l e s , but were never made p r inc ipa l s of the 
5. The Mulei court refused to find viola t ion of an employee's duty when the 
defendant so l i c i t ed the former employer's customers for his new 
competing business, but did not actually begin competing un t i l after he 
was f i red. 739 P.2d at 893. 
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corporation. Moreover, even if they were officers, Appellant 
has failed to establish that they breached any duty owed by 
officers to a corporation. 
1. Williams and Rockwood were not 
principals of Gillham. 
Whether one is an officer owing a fiduciary duty is a 
question of law to be determined by the law of the state of 
incorporation. Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230, 235 (5th Cir. 
1983). Utah law defines officers of a corporation as follows: 
The officers of a corporation shall consist of a 
president, one or more vice-presidents as may be 
prescribed by the bylaws, a secretary, and a 
treasurer, each of whom shall be elected by the 
board of directors at such time and in such 
manner as may be prescribed by the bylaws. Such 
other officers and assistant officers and agents 
as may be deemed necessary may be elected or 
appointed by the board of directors or chosen in 
such other manner as may be prescribed by the 
bylaws. Any two or more offices may be held by 
6. Q: Did you hold any other positions with Gillham? 
A: I was also given the title of vice-president, but that 
was a title that didn't have anything to do with being a 
principal in the corporation. 
Q: What duties, if any, did it have? 
A: Make me feel good. 
Q: Anything other than that? 
A: Did not affect my responsibilities. 
Q: Did you ever sign documents as vice-president? 
A: No. 
(R. 151), Rockwood Depo. 10:21-11:5. 
-14-
the same person, except the offices of president 
and and secretary shall not be held by the same 
person. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-45. The law then requires corporations 
to list the names and addresses of all corporate officers in 
its annual report filed with the Division of Corporations: 
(1) Each domestic corporation and each foreign 
corporation authorized to transact business in 
this state shall file, within the time 
prescribed by this chapter, an annual report 
setting forth: 
. . . 
(d) the names and respective addresses of 
the directors and officers of the corporation; 
• • • 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-121. 
Pursuant to the above law, Gillham filed its 
Corporation Annual Report in 1986 and 1987, both times listing 
its only officers as: Lon Richardson, Jr., President; Ronald 
W. Griffiths, Vice-President; Nancy Mower, Secretary; and Lon 
Richardson, Jr., Treasurer. See p. 2 note 1, supra. The 1986 
annual report was in effect the year the alleged actions took 
place. Neither that report, nor the report for the following 
year list either Respondent as a corporate officer. This 
evidence was before the lower court when it granted 
Respondents' motion for summary judgment and was not 
controverted by Appellant. 
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2. "Executive Officers" as defined by 
insurance law are not officers for 
purposes of finding a strict 
fiduciary duty. 
Appellant recognizes the weakness in its argument 
that Williams and Rockwood were Gillham officers, and so, 
attempts to create a fact issue as to whether Respondents 
could be classified as "executive officers." Such a position 
is irrelevant to a discussion of whether Williams and Rockwood 
owed a fiduciary duty to the company. 
Appellant's brief is replete with insurance cases in 
which the court is asked to determine whether an employee is 
an executive officer for purposes of insurance coverage. That 
situation is not analogous to the one at bar, nor does it give 
rise to an inference that such an "executive officer" owes a 
fiduciary duty to its employer. The public policy which lies 
at the heart of insurance cases is fundamentally different 
from the policy of holding an officer, shareholder or director 
to a fiduciary duty. A basic rule of insurance law is that 
the insurance policy is always construed against the insurer 
and in favor of the insured. P. E. Ashton Co. v. Joyner. 17 
Utah 2d 162, 406 P.2d 306 (Utah 1965); Metropolitan Property & 
Liability Ins. Co. v. Finlayson, 751 P.2d 254 (Utah App. 
1988) . That construction naturally leads to a broader 
definition of what constitutes an "officer", which 
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construction will affect whether coverage is found in the 
case. 
In contrast, the fiduciary duty is narrowly construed 
to apply only to officers, directors, and shareholders of a 
corporation. 3 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 1011 
(Perm. Ed. 1986); Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 
1983) ; Fausett v. American Resources Management Corp., 542 
F.Supp. 1234 (D. Utah 1982). 
Appellant offers no authority in support of its 
proposition that executive officers as defined in insurance 
cases owe a fiduciary duty to a corporation similar to that 
duty owed by directors and officers. Respondent, on the other 
hand, does not suggest that employees owe no duty to the 
employer, but that the duty of an employee is not the same as 
the fiduciary duty owed by officers, directors, and 
stockholders. 
3. "Key Employees" are not fiduciaries of a 
corporation. 
Alternatively, Appellant has argued that Williams and 
Rockwood were "key employees" owing the same type of duty owed 
by directors, shareholders and officers. However, Appellant 
has never offered this court or the court below any Utah law 
which distinguishes between regular employees and so-called 
"key employees" for the purpose of finding a fiduciary duty. 
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Appellant offers only the case of Duane Jones Co, v. 
Burke, 306 N.Y. 172, 117 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y.App. 1954) for the 
proposition that even employees who are clearly not officers 
of the corporation owe the same strict fiduciary duty to their 
employer as do officers. That case, however, does not suggest 
that the duty owed by "key employees" is the same as the 
fiduciary duty owed by officers and directors. In fact, the 
standard used by the court against which the defendants' 
conduct was measured was "the standard required by the law of 
one acting as an agent or employee of another." Duane Jones 
at 245 quoting Lamdin v. Broadway Surface Adv. Corp., 272 N.Y. 
133, 138 5 N.E.2d 66, 67 (emphasis added). 
C. Williams And Rockwood's Conduct Was 
Appropriate Even If They Were Officers of 
Gillham. 
Even if Williams and Rockwood were officers, their 
conduct did not violate any duty owed to Gillham. The duty of 
an officer is defined as follows: 
Concern for the integrity of the employment 
relationship had led courts to establish a rule 
that demands of a corporate officer or employee 
an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the 
corporation. (cites omitted) 
There exists, however, an exception to this 
general requirement of loyalty. Thus an 
employee does not violate his duty of loyalty 
when he merely organizes a corporation during 
his employment to carry on a rival business 
after the expiration of this term of employment, 
(cites omitted) 
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Las Luminarias, 587 P.2d at 449 (emphasis added); see also 3 
Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations § 856 (Perm. Ed. 1986). 
The "fiduciary" duty which Appellant seeks to impose 
is nothing in short of involuntary servitude. Under 
Appellant's theory Williams and Rockwood could not investigate 
other employment alternatives until after they were 
terminated. Such is clearly not the current state of the law. 
See Microbiological Research Corp.. 625 P.2d at 700; Crane 
Co., 576 P.2d at 872-873. 
The decision of the trial court was in accordance 
with well-settled Utah law and is not inconsistent with the 
law of other jurisdictions. In the face of undisputed facts 
concerning Williams' and Rockwood's preparations to create a 
new business while still in Appellant's employ, the court 
properly found that there was no evidence of a breach of 
fiduciary duty. Williams and Rockwood admittedly took 
preliminary steps to form their own advertising agency and 
also informed an employee of one of Gillham's clients, who was 
also their friend, of their prospects to buy Gillham or form 
their own business. However, Respondents never unequivocally 
committed themselves to the alternate plan. It is unclear 
whether these plans would have even been consummated if 
Respondents had not been summarily fired. If Appellant has 
been harmed, it has been by his own actions in firing these 
admittedly valuable employees. 
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Respondents' actions are permitted by Utah law which 
allows an employee to prepare to compete with an employer 
while still in his employ. Moreover, although Utah law under 
some circumstances, may forbid officers charged with fiduciary 
obligations from engaging in conduct which undermines his 
employer's business while still in his employ, the evidence 
that Respondents did not engage in such conduct has gone 
uncontested. Summary judgment was appropriate. 
IV. APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO PLEAD OR OFFER EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF ITS SUPPOSED CLAIM FOR 
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS. 
A. This Tort Claim Was Not Before The Trial 
Court And Is Not Properly Before This 
Court. 
Utah law is unmistakably clear on the point that 
matters not raised in pleadings or addressed before the trial 
court cannot be raised for first time on appeal. Lane v. 
Messer, 731 P.2d 488 (Utah 1986). The Utah Supreme Court 
states: 
Orderly procedure, whose proper purpose is the 
final settlement of controversies, requires that 
a party must present his entire case and his 
theory or theories of recovery to the trial 
court; and having done so, he cannot thereafter 
change to some different theory and thus attempt 
to keep in motion a merry-go-round of 
litigation. 
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Bundy v. Century Equipment Co,, 692 P.2d 754, 758 (Utah 1984), 
cruotina Simpson v. General Motors Corp, , 24 Utah 2d 301, 303, 
470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970). 
Appellant ignores this fundamental concept in its 
appeal. Appellant's suggestion that a claim for intentional 
interference with economic relations was raised below is 
simply unsupported by the record. All of the claims contained 
in the complaint specifically seek redress for alleged harm 
stemming from misuse of Gillham's confidential business 
information. Even if, by some stretch of the imagination, 
this new claim could be implied from language contained in the 
complaint, summary judgment would still be appropriate because 
such a claim would, like all other claims in the complaint, be 
based on alleged misuse of Gillham business information. 
Appellant has already conceded that Williams and Rockwood have 
not misused such information. In light of that concession the 
lower court appropriately dismissed all of Gillham7s claims. 
The only other way this issue could possibly be 
before this court is if it was presented in arguments below. 
Neither Appellant's brief nor Williams' and Rockwood's briefs 
on the motion for summary judgment make a single reference to 
an allegation of intentional interference with prospective 
economic relations. Therefore it would be inappropriate to 
reverse the decision of the lower court on a basis not before 
it. 
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B. Respondents' Undisputed Conduct Was Not 
Tortious, 
Although the claim for intentional interference with 
economic relations is not properly before this court the facts 
in this case do not support such a claim in any event. The 
Utah Supreme Court first recognized the claim of intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage in Leigh 
Furniture and Carpet Co, v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1983). 
In so doing, the court adopted the Oregon approach to the tort 
which "require[s] the plaintiff to allege and prove more than 
the prima-facie tort," Id. at 304. The elements which must 
be proven are: 
(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered 
with the plaintiff's existing or potential 
economic relations, 
(2) for an improper purpose or by improper 
means, 
(3) causing injury to the plaintiff. 
Id. The court held that mere instances of aggressive, or even 
abrasive tactics were not sufficient to show intentional 
interference, but a three-and-one-half years prolonged course 
of abusive conduct as was demonstrated in Leigh was 
sufficient. 
Appellant's brief fails to allege facts which, if 
true, would support the elements of this tort. The undisputed 
facts upon which such a tort would be based are that Williams 
and Rockwood solicited a single Gillham client after they were 
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fired. Such conduct is clearly permitted by Utah law and is 
to be expected in a competitive society. Mulei, 739 P.2d at 
893-894 (interference with contracts terminable at will by 
lawful means justified by privilege of lawful competition). 
Justice Oaks differentiated the tort of intentional 
interference with prospective economic advantage from 
legitimate competition with this language: 
[T]his alternative takes the long view of the 
defendant's conduct, allowing objectionable 
short-run purposes to be eclipsed by legitimate 
long-range economic motivation. Otherwise, much 
competitive commercial activity, such as a 
businessman's efforts to forestall a competitor 
in order to further his own long-range economic 
interests, could become tortious. In the rough 
and tumble of the marketplace, competitors 
inevitably damage one another in the struggle 
for personal advantage. The law offers no 
remedy for those damages—even if 
intentional—because they are an inevitable 
byproduct of competition. 
Leiah. 657 at 307.7 
By al leging tha t Williams and Rockwood engaged in 
conduct r i s i ng to the level of t o r t i ous interference with 
economic r e l a t i o n s , Appellant asks t h i s court to adopt a harsh 
standard imposing t o r t l i a b i l i t y on individuals who fa i r ly 
compete with former employers simply because they successfully 
s o l i c i t c l i e n t e l e of t ha t former employer. Such a r e s u l t 
7. Admittedly, Appellant was injured when KSL decided to hire Respondents' 
advert ising agency. However, that injury by i t s e l f wi l l not give r i se 
to t o r t l i a b i l i t y when clear ly there was no improper purpose or means 
u t i l i z ed by the defendant. 
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flies in the face of principles repeatedly established by the 
Utah Supreme Court that any duty to a former employer ceases 
after termination and those employees are free to compete with 
their former employer. Microbiological Research Corp., 62 5 
P.2d at 695; Crane Co. v. Dahle, 576 P.2d 870, 872-873. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON RESPONDENTS7 COUNTERCLAIM FOR THE 
BONUS MONEY. 
It is not clear on the face of Appellant's brief 
whether it is appealing the trial court's award of the $4,000 
unpaid bonus money to Mr. Rockwood. Appellant makes no 
mention of the court's decision on that issue until the 
conclusion of the brief when it states that "the trial court 
erred in awarding Rockwood the $4,000 bonus money" and asks 
this court to reverse the district court's September 15 Order 
granting summary judgment on Respondents' counterclaim. Brief 
at 45. 
Reversal of the trial court's decision on that 
counterclaim is inappropriate for two reasons. First, nowhere 
in Appellant's brief does Appellant offer any reasons as to 
how the court's decision on that issue constitutes error. 
Second, at the hearing before the trial court on the motion 
for summary judgment, Appellant's attorney conceded that Mr. 
Rockwood was entitled to the bonus money and agreed to pay the 
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full amount remaining due.8 The trial court accordingly ruled 
in Respondents' favor on the counterclaim from the bench. The 
order was entered three days later. Appellant then paid the 
bonus money to Mr. Rockwood on November 10, 1988. Appellant 
cannot now retract from that concession and ask this court to 
find error. For those reasons, the September 15 Order should 
be affirmed. 
VI. DEPOSITION COSTS WERE APPROPRIATELY AWARDED TO 
WILLIAMS AND ROCKWOOD. 
Appellant correctly states the standard governing 
entitlement to costs for depositions, but incorrectly applies 
that standard to the case at bar. The Utah law in that regard 
is that costs for depositions will not be awarded unless those 
depositions are necessary to the party's presentation of the 
case. Nelson v. Newman, 583 P.2d 601 (Utah 1978). 
Further, the determination as to whether those 
depositions were necessary is committed to the discretion of 
the trial judge. Highland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific 
Railroad Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984). A finding of 
necessity does not require actual use of those depositions at 
a full-blown trial. In fact, use of the depositions to 
support a party's motion for summary judgment will suffice. 
8. This concession was undoubtedly based on Mr. Richardson's testimony that 
he had not paid the bonus because he had "forgotten to do so." 
(R. 119). 
-25-
Roy v, Neibauer. 623 P.2d 555 (Mont. 1981). Appellant's 
suggestion that costs should not have been awarded because 
there was no trial is absurd. 
Appellant does not contend that the depositions were 
unnecessary to Williams' and Rockwood's motion for summary 
judgment. In fact the record will indicate how extensively 
Respondent relied on those depositions in presenting its case 
to the court. 
Appellant also argues that the costs of the 
deposition transcripts should not be awarded because discovery 
through interrogatories would have been less expensive. What 
Appellant fails to mention is that all but one of the 
depositions was taken at Appellant's request—as Appellant's 
chosen method of discovery. Williams and Rockwood should not 
be forced to give up the costs awarded simply because 
Appellant selected an expensive method of discovery. 
Clearly the district judge did not abuse his 
discretion in awarding costs of deposition transcripts to 
Williams and Rockwood. This court should, therefore, uphold 
the district judge's decision in that regard. 
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CONCLUSION 
This lawsuit began as a series of claims against 
Williams and Rockwood for alleged misuses of Gillham business 
information. When it became clear that no such information 
had been misused, Williams and Rockwood immediately moved for 
summary judgment. This precipitated a change of tactics by 
Gillham, and, in response to the motion for summary judgment, 
Gillham raised a claim for breach of a fiduciary duty. 
However the trial court granted the motion by Williams and 
Rockwood finding no dispute of material fact as to both the 
four claims raised in the complaint and the breach of 
fiduciary duty claim raised in response to the motion for 
summary judgment. 
Gillham has once again employed the same tactics in 
its appeal to this court. For the first time Gillham has 
alleged intentional interference with economic relations 
despite the fact that no such claim was before the trial 
court. This transparent attempt to breathe life into the 
complaint on which summary judgment was properly granted 
should not detain this court. 
The court below properly granted summary judgment for 
Respondents on all counts, including the counterclaim. The 
award of costs was also appropriate. This court should 
therefore, affirm the lower court's decisions. 
-27-
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of May, 1989 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
/ 
Mary Arfne Q. Wood 
Paicfel/a B. Hunsaker 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of the 
Respondents this 26th day of May, 1989, to the following: 
Milo S. Marsden, Jr., Esq. 
Jamis S. Johnson, Esq. 
Marsden, Orton & Cahoon 
68 South Main, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Virginia Curtis Lee, Esq. 
1458 Princeton Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105 
# r u w , C^jC 
AL2/PBHP 
- 2 8 -
Tabl 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
DIVISIf OF CORPORATIONS AND COMMER .L CODE 
CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT i 
tin i' 
•£. I J! 
»* comphenca with Seetion 10-10-121 It 122 and Section 16-10-12 or 16-10-110. U.C A., 1653 tht following report ,end if apoliceo«« 
tne statement of cn«no« of registered offict end'or agent ti submitted* (PlfASS Tv»S pa, PRINT CLEARLY" 
13 EXACT CORPORATE NAME 
REGISTERED AGENT 
REGISTERED OFFICE 
016993 INC: 0 6 / 2 2 / 1 9 2 5 D 
GILLHAM ADVERTISING AGENCY 
RICHARD H OGAARD S/D 
15 EAST 1ST SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111 
INC 
QO IF NEW REGISTERED AGENT AND/OR OFFICE, PLEASE COMPLETE 
New Registered Agent _ 
New Registered Office 
Nancy tower / l^r ; ''T^T' 
City 
(Registered agent's signature) 
Sute UTAH Ztp 
(Street Address) 
fW"»*i t*e stev** • * s n g * •*•! • * * * » « M •*»« 'eg ' i t»r#d e f f i r * pnf tH»
 (H4r*s« 0 f •*«• nVf»f»es* «!«•#»•» ©f ••»• r»g*«>i«>r*4 agent * f» ie**t tcel » 
QO INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF titan 
0 
SI 
IS 
(STATE OR COUNTRY; 
IF INCORPORATED OUTSIDE THE STATE OF UTAH, GIVE THE ADDRESS OF THE PRINCIPAL OFFICE 
IN THE STATE OR COUNTRY OF INCORPORATION. 
State or 
City Country Zip 
(Street Address) 
TYPE OF BUSINESS CONDUCTED IN UTAH Advertising 
NAMES AND RESPECTIVE ADDRESSES OF THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF THE CORPORATION. 
NAME STREET CITY, STATE, ZIP 
president Lon Richardson, Jr. 872 Woodruff Way SLC Ut. 84108 
v,ce-Pres.oem Ronald W;. Gr i f f i ths 8520 Kings H i l l Drive SLC Ut. 84121 
Secretary Nancy Mower 3613 South 5750 West SLC Ut. 84120 
Treasurer Lon Richardson, Jr. 872 Woodruff Way SLC Ut. 84108 
CD DIRECTORS: (UTAH LAW REQUIRES AT LEAST 3 DIRECTORS.) 
NAME 
IS 
B 
1 Lon Richardson, Sr. 
2 Lon Richardson, Jr. 
3 Zoe Ann Richardson 
AUTHORIZED SHARES (DO NOT CHANGE THE INFORMATION LISTED.) 
STREET ADDRESS 
1280 4th Avenue 
872 Woodruff Way 
872 Woodruff Way 
Number of Shares 
Authorized 
2,500 
Itemized 
By Class 
COMMON 
Series, If Any 
Within A Class 
NUMBER OF SHARES ISSUED (MUST BE COMPLETED) 
Number of Shares Itemized Series, If Any 
Issued By Class Within A Class 
Par Value 
Of Shares 
10.0000 
.0C00 
Par Value 
Of Shares 
10.00 
CITV, STATE ZIP 
84103 
84108 
84108 
SLC, Ut. 
SLC, Ut. 
SLC, Ut. 
Number of Shares 
Wifnout r»r v.iue 
Number of Shares 
Without Par Value 
STATED CAPfTAL AS OF DATE OF THIS REPORT (Numbar of Shares Issued X Par Valuatt 11 fW) 
Under the penalties of perjury end as en authorized officer, I declare that this annual report anc, if applicable, the statement of cnanpe of 
registered offtet and/or egent. has been examined by me and is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, true, correct end complete 
1400 Retired ' 
533 B Y . 7 <*<-\JU 
f i c e r a / 1 Authorized Of icer 
(If Registered Agent and/or Registered OHica hes been chenged on this form.said 
ehengt must be authorized by a resolution edopted by the Board of Directors, and 
Tha President or Vies President must sign the report.) 
EE $5.00 Make cheek payable to Annual Report Section 
PURSUANT TO SECTION 1 6 - 1 0 - 1 2 1 AND 122, U.C.A., ALL 
CORPORATIONS MUST FILE THEIR ANNUAL REPORTS WITHIN THE 
10NTH OF THEIR ANNIVERSARY DATE FAILURE TO DO SO WILL 
ESULT IN SUSPENSION OF THE CORPORATIONS CHARTER. 
e^^v a.i*^«ej» a^i t A k i A P > «^*% A I ^»e» 
D 0*uA+J-
Title or Position 
83 D A T E June 5> , 19 M 
Send Report & ^—^ 
Remittance to: Annual Report Division / « S \ 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 2ND FLOftf 
P.O.Box 45801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0801 
(801)530-6012 
Tab 2 
D I V I S I O N OP CORPORATIONS A N D C O M M E R C I A L CODE 
CORPORATION A N N U A L REPORT 
in compliance with Section 16-10-121 l> 122. and Sacuon 16-10-12 or 16-10-110. U.C.A.. 1953 th« following 
tha statamant of changa of ragntarad offica and/or agant. it submittad (PLEASE TYPE 0* PRINT CLEARLY') 
016993 INC: 06/22/1925 D 
J ] EXACT CORPORATE NAME GILLHAM ADVERTISING AGENCY INC 
REGISTERED AGENT NAKCY K0WER / s 
15 EAST 1ST SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111 
REv e S i 
STATE OF u ' A * 
irt and if apoitcabta 
REGISTERED OFFICE 
2] IF NEW REGISTERED AGENT AND/OR OFFICE, PLEASE COMPLETE 
New Registered Agent 
RECEIVED 
^ 1 3 1967 
New Registered Office City 
(fiegistereo agents signature) 
State UTAH Zip 
(Street Address) 
(With the above change, tha addrass of tha registered offica and tha address of ma business office of tha registered agent ars identical.) 
3D INCORPORATED UNDER THE LAWS OF. 
3 
1 
1] 
Utah .(STATE OR COUNTRY). 
IF INCORPORATED OUTSIDE THE STATE OF UTAH, GIVE THE ADDRESS OF THE PRINCIPAL OFFICE 
IN THE STATE OR COUNTRY OF INCORPORATION. 
State or 
City Country Zip 
(Street Address) 
TYPE OF BUSINESS CONDUCTED IN UTAH Advertising 
NAMES AND RESPECTIVE ADDRESSES OF THE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS OF THE CORPORATION. 
NAME STREET CITY STATE ZIP 
Resident Lon Richardson, J r . 872 Woodruff Way SLC Ut. 84108 
v.ce-Pres.oem Ronald W. G r i f f i t h s 8520 Kings H i l l Drive SLC Ut. 84121 
Secretary Nancy Mower 3613 South 575C West SLC Ut. 84120 
Treasurer Lon Richardson, J r . 872 Woodruff Way SLC Ut. 84108 
3 DIRECTORS: (UTAH LAW REQUIRES AT LEAST 3 DIRECTORS.) 
NAME 
s 
i Lon Richardson, Sr. 
2 Lon Richardson, J r . 
3 Zoe Ann Richardson 
AUTHORIZED SHARES (DO NOT CHANGE THE INFORMATION LISTED.) 
STREET ADDRESS 
1280 4th Avenue 
872 Woodruff Way 
872 Woodruff Way 
CITY, STATE, ZIP 
0-5 
ttdmber of Shares 
Authorized 
2 , 5 0 0 
Iter*!*** 
By Clait 
COMMON 
2C 
3-
NUMBER OF SHARES ISSUED (MUST BE COMPLETED) 
Number of Shares Itemized 
Issued By Class 
Series. 
Within 
"HUDI CT1 
J M r L C 1 
Series, 
Within 
If Arty 
A Class 
•cn \ 
If Any 
A Class 
P*r Value 
Of Shares 
1 0 . 0 0 0 0 
.cooo 
P*r Value 
Of Shares 
10.00 
SLC 
SLC 
SLC 
Ut. 
Ut. 
Ut. 
84103 
84108 
84108 
Number of Shares 
Without Per Value 
Number of Shares 
Without Par Value 
STATED CAPITAL AS OF DATE OF THIS REPORT (Number of Shares Issued X Par ValualS 11,000* 
Unotr me Panama* of par jury and as an authorized officer, I daciara that this annual r a port and, if applicable, tha statement of change of 
ragistarao offica and/or agant, has been axamirvad by ma and »s. to tha bast of my knowledge and belief, true corract, and eomptata 
*14p0 Retired r 
3 BY_ 
/ Autnonzed Offictr {/ 
<if Ragtsiarad Agant and/or Registered Offica has h%%r\ changed on this form.said 
chengt must ba author i*ed by • resolution adopt a 0 by tha Board of Oiractors, and 
Tnt Presioant or Vica President must sign tha raport.) 
• l/7LJ^<.*(j?^^f-
Titie or Position 
Q DATE May 1: .19 8 1 
Send Report & 
Remittance to: 
z $5.00 Make check payable to Annual fteport Section 
JRSUArsTT TO SECTION 1 6 - 1 0 - 1 2 1 AND 122, U.C.A., ALL 
RPORATIONS MUST FILE THEIR ANNUAL REPORTS WITHIN THE 
)NTH OF THEIR ANNIVERSARY DATE. FAILURE TO DO SO WILL 
SULT IN SUSPENSION OF THE CORPORATIONS CHARTER 
:S*H.2FS. -i is DO NOT CHANGE OR ALTER THIS FORM 
Annual Report Division 
160 EAST 300 SOUTH 2ND FLOOR 
P.O.Box 45801 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0801 
(801)530-6012 
Tab 3 
EXHIBIT 3 
Uncontroverted Facts 
1. Gillham is a Utah corporation 
engaged in the advertising 
business, having its principal 
place of business in Salt Lake 
City. [R. 002, 5 1; 079, 5 1] 
2. Williams and Rockwood are 
residents of Salt Lake County. 
[R. 002, 55 2-3; 080, 5 2] 
3. While with Gillham, Williams 
and Rockwood worked on the KSL 
advertising account. [R. 080, 
1 5] 
4. KSL had been a client of 
Gillham's for 10 or 12 years 
and, after First Security Bank, 
was Gillham's largest account. 
[R. 179, 55 10-11] 
5. Keith Hill, a former Gillham 
employee, was the KSL employee 
in charge of KSL's advertising 
accounts. [R. 080, 5 6; 081, 5 
9] 
6. Hill was a friend of both 
Williams and Rockwood. [R. 
081, 5 10] 
7. While with Gillham, Williams 
and Rockwood discussed with 
Hill their plans to purchase 
Gillham or form their own 
business. [R. 081, 5 11] 
8. While with Gillham, Williams 
and Rockwood prepared a "To Do" 
checklist of things to be done 
to form their own business if 
their negotiations to purchase 
Gillham failed. [R. 082, 5 
13] 
9. In establishing their new 
business entity, Williams and 
Response 
1. Respondents agree. 
2. £4. 
3. IdL 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. Those discussions took 
place on Respondents' own time. 
[R. 081, 5 11 - also cited by 
Appellant] 
8. Id. 
9. Appellant has already conceded 
that any forms used by Williams 
Rockwood reviewed and 
incorporated certain forms from 
Gillham. [R. 083, 1 20] 
10. On March 27, 1987, after 
Gillham discovered the "To Do" 
checklist and discussed it with 
Williams and Rockwood, Gillham 
dismissed Williams and 
Rockwood. [ 082, f 14] 
11. Soon thereafter, KSL 
transferred its advertising 
business from Gillham to 
Williams and Rockwood. [R. 
083, J 19] 
12. In Count III of its Complaint, 
Gillham alleges Williams and 
Rockwood owed fiduciary duties 
to Gillham which they breached, 
thereby damaging Gillham. [R. 
006, M 18-21] 
Controverted Fact No. 1 
1. Whether Williams and Rockwood 
were key employees and officers 
of Gillham or whether they were 
ordinary employees. 
Facts According to Gillham 
1. Williams was Senior Vice-
President, supervisor, and 
primary contact person at 
Gillham on the First Security 
accountf Gillham's largest 
account, which it had serviced 
for 35 years. In 1986, 
Gillham"s annual gross billings 
to First Security were about 
$600,000 and amounted to about 
40 percent of Gillham's income. 
First Security left Gillham in 
and Rockwood did not constitute 
confidential business 
information. [R. 083 J 21, R. 
109, 110] 
10. This is not in dispute. 
11. Id. 
12. Count III actually reads that 
Williams and Rockwood "breached 
said fiduciary duties in that 
they failed to use the Gillham 
Business Information in such a 
manner as to benefit Gillham, 
but rather breached their 
fiduciary duties by using the 
information and conducting 
themselves in a manner to 
benefit themselves individually 
and the business entity of 
Rockwood and Williams." 
Complaint f 20. [R. 005, J 20] 
1. This is not a controverted 
fact, but is a question of law. 
Lewis v. Rnutson. 699 F.2d 230, 
235 (5th Cir. 1983). 
1. Williams was not a principal of 
the corporation but was an 
officer by title only. [R. 227 
see also argument re: fiduciary 
duty.] 
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March, 1987. [R. 178-179, U 
3-9] 
2. As Vice-President and creative 
art director, Rockwood was 
responsible for Gillham's 
entire creative department 
consisting of two full-time 
writers, four fill-time 
artists, and regular free 
lancers. [Deposition of Scott 
Rockwood, p. 9, lines 5-18] 
3. Williams and Rockwood did not 
punch a time clock at Gillham. 
They had tasks and deadlines 
and worked until they were 
done. Rockwood arrived at 8:00 
a.m. or earlier and worked 
until 6:00 p.m. or 8:00 p.m. 
most nights, often working 
through lunch. [Deposition of 
Scott Rockwood, p. 61, line 15 
to p. 62 line 9] 
4. For several months prior to 
their termination, Williams and 
Rockwood discussed with Lon 
Richardson, Gillham's President 
and principal shareholder, the 
purchase of Gillham for about 
$500,000 plus good will. 
Williams and Rockwood wanted 
control of Gillham in one (1) 
year; Richardson wanted to 
retain control for five (5) 
years. [R. 179, U 12-16] 
5. Williams recognized that 
Richardson had discretion in 
paying bonuses, depending on 
Gillham's profits. In March, 
1987, Richardson paid Williams 
and Rockwood each $1,000 as a 
bonus for 1986. [R. 179, ft 
12-16] 
6. Because Williams and Rockwood 
felt their bonuses were too 
small, in mid-March, 1987, 
Williams prepared a "To Do" 
checklist of things to 
accomplish prior to their 
2. Rockwood also was not a 
principal of the corporation 
but was a vice-president by 
title only. Id. 
3. Respondent does not contest 
this fact, but simply points 
out it is not relevant to the 
issues before the court. 
4. Id. 
5. Appellant's citation to the 
record does not support the 
fact alleged. Moreover this 
does not change the fact that 
Mr. Richardson promised Mr. 
Rockwood a $5000 "incentive 
bonus." [R. 083-084 %% 22-25] 
6. Williams states, In a portion 
of the deposition referred to 
by Appellant, that the bonus 
issue was not the only 
precipitating event for 
Respondents' decision to plan 
to create a competing 
-3-
departure from Gillham. [R. 
181, 55 28-31] 
Facts According to Williams and 
Rockwood 
1. Williams and Rockwood were 
employed by Gillham as 
employees at will. [R. 018, 5 
4; 080, 5 4; 075, 55 2-3; 167, 
11 2-3] 
advertising agency. As to the 
bonus issue he states "And I 
would say that that might have 
given us more motivation than 
we had before. But I wouldn't 
say that that was the event." 
Williams Depo. 20:23-25. 
1. Although Williams and Rockwood 
have taken the position set 
forth opposite, Appellant's 
organization of facts should 
not be read to suggest that 
Respondents do not agree at all 
with the foregoing "Facts 
According to Gillham." In 
fact, as set forth above, 
Respondents do agree with most 
of the "Facts According to 
Gillham" but only seek to add 
the foregoing clarification. 
Moreover, it should be noted 
that Appellant has not taken 
issue with the opposite "Facts 
According to Williams and 
Rockwood." 
Controverted Fact No. 2 
2. Whether Williams and Rockwood, 
while employees and officers of 
Gillham, determined upon a 
course of conduct which, when 
subsequently carried out, 
resulted in benefit to 
themselves from the taking of 
the KSL account from Gillham in 
violation of fiduciary duties 
of good faith and fair dealing 
they owed Gillham. 
Facts According to Gillham 
In its Memorandum in Opposition 
Summary Judgment, Gillham asserted 
the following supplemental facts: 
22. Defendants wanted the KSL 
business and directly solicited 
that business from Hill. 
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 26, 
22. Respondents admit this fact, 
but with the clarification that 
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lines 13-15; p. 28, lines 
23-25). [R. 180] 
any and all solicitation of the 
KSL business took place after 
termination. Rockvood depo. p. 
24, lines 3-13; p. 25, line 15 
through p. 26, line 15; 
affidavits of Williams and 
Rockvood. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
Defendants eventually got the 
KSL advertising business away 
from Gillham. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 30, lines 5-9). 
[R. 180] 
Defendants, in leaving Gillham, 
knew they had to talk to Hill 
and present a plan to show 
their interest in handling the 
KSL business. (Deposition of 
Williams, p. 23, lines 1-6). 
[R. 180] 
Defendants met with Hill prior 
to their termination. 
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 18, 
lines 23-25). They talked 
about starting their own 
business. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 19, lines 22-24; 
Deposition of Williams, p. 24, 
lines 15-18). [R. 181] 
Defendants talked to Keith Hill 
and presented a plan. 
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 17, 
lines 6-14). [R. 181] 
23. Not controverted and not 
relevant. 
24. However, Respondents did not 
present a plan to KSL until 
after they were terminated. 
[R. 075-076, R. 082 H 16-17, 
R. 167-168] 
25. Hill was a KSL employee acting 
as the contact person with 
Gillham. Hill depo. p. 13, 
lines 17-23. The primary 
purpose of his meetings with 
Respondents was to discuss 
KLS/Gillham business. Rockvood 
depo. p. 18, lines 18-19. Utah 
lav does not prohibit employees 
from discussing future plans 
vith the employer's clients. 
These efforts vere made on 
Respondents' own time. [R. 
081, % 11] This fact remains 
uncontroverted. Furthermore, 
Appellant does not suggest that 
Respondents tried to solicit 
the KSL account prior to their 
termination. 
26. The solicitation did not take 
place until after termination. 
In fact, in Appellant's 
citation to the deposition, 
Appellant cuts off the excerpts 
at the point the deponent (Mr. 
Rockvood) makes it absolutely 
clear that the solicitation did 
not take place until after he 
and Mr. Williams had been 
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terminated beginning where 
Appellant left off: 
Prior to Defendants' 
termination, they discussed 
with Keith Hill if he would be 
interested in joining their new 
agency and he responded yes. 
(Deposition of Hill, p. 38, 
lines 12-15). [R. 181] 
In mid-March, 1987, Tim 
Williams prepared a "To Do" 
checklist of things to 
accomplish prior to Defendants 
departure from Gillham. 
Q. When did yo\i do that? 
A. Directly talking to Keith 
about these plans would have 
probably been approximately 
- well, one of the last days 
of March or first of April. 
Q. It was before your 
termination or after? 
A. It was after. 
Q. You had had no discussions 
with this prior to your 
termination? 
A. Define "this", what do you 
mean by "this"? 
Q. About this item of 
presenting a plan. 
A. Presenting a plan, no, we 
had no discussions. 
Rockwood depo. p. 17, lines 
15-25. Keith Hill also says in 
his deposition that Williams 
and Rockwood did not present a 
plan until after their 
termination: 
Q. Its your testimony that they 
didn't present any plan to 
you prior to March 26th? 
A. No written plan. 
Q. An oral plan? 
A. Not to my recollection. 
Hill depo. p. 41, lines 12-16. 
[R. 224] 
27. This fact is not relevant. 
28. This conduct is not relevant 
because even if there were a 
dispute as to whether the 
conduct took place it is not 
material to this action. 
Moreover, it is uncontroverted 
-6-
(Deposition of Williams, p. 16, 
lines 18-20). [R. 181] 
29. The "To Do" checklist was 
prepared prior to Defendants' 
termination. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 16, lines 1-4). 
[R. 181] 
30. The "To Do" checklist is in Tim 
Williams handwriting. 
(Deposition of Williams, p. 16, 
line 17). [R. 181] 
31. Defendants prepared the "To Do" 
checklist because they felt 
they were not fairly dealt with 
in the 1986 bonus money Gillham 
paid them in March, 1987. 
(Deposition of Williams, p. 20, 
lines 19-25). [R. 181] 
32. Some of the checklist items 
were performed prior to 
termination. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 16, line 18). [R. 
181] 
33. Defendants crossed off the "To 
Do" checklist items they had 
accomplished. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 16, line 24). [R. 
182] 
34. Defendants crossed off items on 
the "To Do" checklist they in 
fact had accomplished. 
(Deposition of Williams, p. 26 
line 18). [R. 182] 
35. Defendants were following a 
time table on the "To Do" 
checklist. (Deposition of 
Williams, p. 28, line 17). [R. 
182] 
36. Prior to their termination, 
Defendants talked with Gene 
Yates, a Gillham employee about 
Defendants starting a new 
business and asked Gene Yates 
to come with them. (Deposition 
that these efforts took place 
on Respondents' own time. [R. 
081 J 11] 
29. IsL. 
30. I<L 
31. See p. 4 \ 6 supra. 
32. See f 30 supra. 
33. Id. Respondents also crossed 
items off the To Do list which 
they decided not to do. [R. 
221] 
34. 14. 
35. Li. 
36. Respondents did not ask Mr. 
Yates to work for the agency 
they were planning to create. 
In fact, the portion of the 
deposition quoted by Appellant 
contains Mr. Rockwood's 
statement that "We didn't make 
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of Rockwood, p. 40, line 18; p. 
41, line 12), [R. 182] 
37. Defendants had contacted an 
accountant for their new 
business prior to their Gillham 
termination. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 36, line 6). [R. 
182] 
38. Defendants had obtained 
stationery for their new 
business and a logo prior to 
their Gillham termination. 
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 38, 
lines 5, 15). [R. 182] 
39. Defendants planned their 
expenses prior to their Gillham 
termination. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 44, lines 2-14). 
[R. 182] 
40. Defendants listed the Gillham 
employee, Dave Bodie, on the 
checklist as a potential 
employee for Defendants' new 
advertising agency. 
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 46, 
lines 4-24). [R. 182-183] 
41. Defendants looked at office 
space prior to their 
termination. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 47, lines 10-15). 
[R. 183] 
42. Defendants gathered 
incorporation and bylaw 
materials for their new 
advertising agency prior to 
their termination. (Deposition 
of Rockwood, p. 48, lines 
1-22). [R. 183] 
him an offer. . . . " Rockwood 
Depo. 41:10. 
37. See 28, supra. 
38. 1 ^ 
39. Id. 
40. Appellant has mischaracterized 
Rockwood's deposition as to 
this point. Mr. Bodie was not 
on the checklist as a potential 
employee for Respondent's new 
agency, but, as Rockwood 
explains in his deposition 
immediately following the 
portion quoted by Appellant, 
was on the list because: 
A. He was one of the people 
that we didn't feel would be 
able to go into this 
business with us. 
Rockwood Depo. 47:4-5. 
41. Not relevant. See 28, supra. 
42. Id,. 
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43. Defendants copied a radio reel 
and "Home Equity Loan Blues" 
work produced at gillham prior 
to their termination. 
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 49, 
lines 13-25). [R. 183] 
44. Defendants priced the cost of 
telephones before their Gillham 
termination. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 55, line 20). [R. 
182] 
45. Lon Richardson showed 
Defendants the "To Do" 
checklist and it was obvious to 
Richardson that Defendants 
fully intended to leave Gillham 
and were in the process of 
doing so. (Deposition of 
Richardson, p. 134, lines 
20-25; p. 135, lines 1-3). [R. 
183] 
46. Tim Williams and Scott Rockwood 
held a number of closed-door 
meetings in Tim Williams' 
office prior to termination. 
(Deposition of Richardson, p. 
128, lines 22-23; deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 60, lines 4-25). 
[R. 183] 
48. Defendants prepared a written 
business plan and financial 
statement prior to their 
termination. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 43, lines 19-23). 
[R. 184] 
49. Defendants prepared a budget to 
submit to KSL for their new 
advertising agency take over of 
the KSL account prior to their 
termination. (Deposition of 
Williams, p. 28, line 25; p. 
29, lines 1-6). [R. 184] 
43. The type of information used or 
copied by Respondents is not 
relevant to this dispute 
because Appellant has already 
conceded that Respondents did 
not use any confidential 
business information. [R. 083 
% 21, R. 109-110] 
44. Not relevant. See 33, supra. 
45. Id,. 
46. liu 
48. Id. 
49. Appellant's structure of this 
sentence may give rise to an 
implication that Respondents 
planned to submit the budget to 
KSL before their termination. 
In fact, Respondents did not 
solicit KSL until after they 
were terminated. [R. 075-076, 
R. 082 11 16-17, R. 167-168] 
This is ^incontroverted. 
Moreover, the excerpt quoted 
55. Defendants began preparations 
for their business presentation 
materials known as "leave 
behind" materials prior to 
their termination. (Deposition 
of Rockwood, p. 44, lines 
15-25). [R. 185] 
56. Prior to terminating 
Defendants, Lon Richardson met 
with Keith Hill's supervisor, 
William Murdock, at the KSL 
offices, and Keith Hill had 
already told William Murdock 
about the possibility of some 
of Gillham's employees not 
remaining with Gillham after 
the loss of the First Security 
Bank Account. (Deposition of 
Richardson, p. 130, lines 
16-20). [R. 185] 
57. Defendants told Lon Richardson 
they were in the process of 
doing the things that were on 
the checklist and had done some 
of them. (Deposition of 
Richardson, p. 135, lines 
10-14). [R. 185] 
58. Lon Richardson reviewed the "To 
Do" checklist and determined 
that Defendants were planning 
to start their own agency and 
had begun the process. 
(Deposition of Richardson, p. 
127, lines 6-8). [R. 185] 
59. Defendants told Lon Richardson 
that the items that were 
crossed off on the checklist 
for the most part had been 
done. (Deposition of 
does not say that Respondents 
did, in fact, prepare a KSL 
budget, but only that they 
"knew that if ve were to go 
into business that as part of 
the plan we presented to KSL 
that ve would have to propose 
budget." Williams Depo. 
29:3-5. 
55. Sge 43, supra. 
56. Not relevant. 
57. See 28, supra. 
58. IdL 
59. Id. 
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Richardson, p. 136, lines 4-8). 
[R. 186] 
60. Tim Williams called Keith Hill 
the morning following 
Defendants' dismissal from 
Gillham. (Deposition of Hill, 
p. 21, lines 5-12). [R. 186] 
61. Defendants told Keith Hill they 
were alarmed that Lon 
Richardson had found the "To 
Do" checklist; they were amazed 
and it was a shocking situation 
for them. (Deposition of Hill, 
p. 24, lines 16-24). [R. 186] 
62. Defendants told Keith Hill that 
Lon Richardson found the "To 
Do" checklist containing items 
Defendants were doing in 
preparation for starting their 
own advertising agency. 
(Deposition of Hill, p. 22, 
lines 2-6). [R. 186] 
63. Defendants asked Keith Hill if 
he would be interested in them 
providing service. (Deposition 
of Hill, p. 23, lines 13-21). 
[R. 186] 
64. Keith Hill's Day-Timer shows 
that on Wednesday, March 25, 
1987, he met with Tim and Scott 
on an agency decision. Hill 
indicated a "go but without 
fuss of other agencies; OK on 
high-end creative and a la 
carte services." (Deposition 
of Hill, p. 39, line 23; p. 41, 
line 4; Affidavit of Milo S. 
Marsden, Jr.). [R. 186] 
65. Keith Hill's Day-Timer 
indicates that he met with the 
Defendants on Saturday, March 
28, 1987. (Deposition of Hill, 
p. 40, lines 15-17). [R. 187] 
66. Keith Hill decided to give the 
KSL advertising work to 
Defendants' new agency the 
60. Not relevant. 
61. li. 
62. Id,. 
63. The conversation referred to 
opposite took place after 
Respondents had been 
terminated. [R. 135-138] [See 
also R. 075-076, R. 082 U 
16-17, R. 167-168, R. 135-138] 
64. Not relevant. 
65. See 60, supra. 
66. !£,. 
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Saturday after the Defendants' 
termination from Gillham. 
(Deposition of Hill, p. 28, 
lines 10-21). [R. 187] 
70. Keith Hill's Day-Timer 
indicates, "Lon fires Tim and 
Scott" Thursday, March 26, 
1987. (Deposition of Hill, p. 
40, lines 4-11). [R. 187] 
71. William Murdock of KSL called 
Lon Richardson in less than a 
week after Defendants' 
termination at Gillham and told 
Lon Richardson that he had 
decided to give the business to 
Defendants. (Deposition of 
Richardson, p. 153, lines 
11-23). [R. 187] 
76. Defendants employ six full-time 
employees; five of the six 
full-time employees were former 
Gillham employees. (Deposition 
of Rockwood, page 12, line 11.) 
[R. 188] 
77. Gillham received approximately 
$200,000 in fees from KSL 
during 1986. (Deposition of 
Rockwood, p. 69, line 22; p. 
70, line 3). [R. 188] 
78. Defendants' new agency received 
approximately $120,000 from KSL 
in 1987 for the months April 
through December, 1987. 
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 70, 
line 15). [R. 188] 
Facts According to 
Williams and Rockwood 
70. Not relevant. 
71. The decision was made in 
response to post-termination 
solicitation. [R. 075-076, R. 
082 %1 16-17, R. 167-168] 
76. Not relevant. 
77. Not relevant. See 60, supra. 
78. Id. 
In their Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, 
Williams and Rockwood assert as a 
material fact: 
11. Williams and Rockwood discussed 
their plans to purchase Gillham 
or form their own business with 
Hill on their own time. 
(Deposition of Rockwood, p. 22 
Respondents' assertion that 
all activities and 
preparation for their 
competing advertising agency 
took place on their own time 
has not been contested by 
Appellant. 
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at line 21; p. 23 at line 1; 
Deposition of Williams, p. 23 
at line 10-22; Deposition of 
Hill, p. 20 at lines 3-12). 
[R. 081] 
AKl/PBHP 
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